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Devines v. Maier: The Seventh Circuit Extends the
Right of Just Compensation to Tenants for the
Taking of Their Leasehold
INTRODUCTION

In Devines v. Maier,1 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that tenants ordered by the City of Milwaukee to vacate
their apartments due to uninhabitable building conditions have
a constitutional right to just compensation for the taking of their
leasehold interests. 2 The court recognized that the city's order to
vacate the premises placed a significant economic burden upon
the tenants. Consequently, the court determined that the fairness
dictated by the "takings clause" of the fifth amendment 3 mandated that this burden, which resulted from the valid exercise of
a state police power, 4 be distributed among the public as the
beneficiaries of state action.5
Traditionally, the protection of the "takings clause" in a rental
context has been afforded only to commercial tenants with longterm leases. 6 Devines is constitutionally significant because it is
the first case to extend the reach of the "takings clause" to residential tenants with month-to-month tenancies who face the
prospect of displacement from their neighborhood as a result of
the valid exercise of a state police power. 7 Devines may have a
substantial impact upon municipalities because a precedent
1. 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
2. Id. at 146.
3. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. The fifth amendment has been made applicable against the states through the
operation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Chicago B. &
Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). State police powers are those powers the
state exercises to promote public health, safety or morals. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
661 (1887). See generally E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER (1904).
5. Devines, 665 F.2d at 146.
6. See, e.g., Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). Month-to-month tenancies, such as those
involved in the Devines case, have historically been considered to be non-compensable
when taken by the government. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 505 (1974).
7. The concept of compensation for the taking of private property by the state had its
origins in England. In response to pressures from owners of freeholds who were fearful of
expropriation of their land by the King, a compensation provision was included as Chap-

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

requiring governments to pay to residential tenants damages
flowing from the enforcement of valid building code regulations
now exists.8
While the Seventh Circuit clearly recognized the plaintiffs'
constitutional right to just compensation, the court did not address the issue of what the appropriate measure of just compensation should be for the taking. 9 Rather, the court delegated this
task to the district court for determination on remand. Due to the
dissatisfaction of both parties with the subsequent determination
by the lower court, the question of damages is currently pending
before the Seventh Circuit on the basis of cross-appeals from the
district court's order. 10
This note will discuss the implications of the Devines decision
from both a constitutional perspective and from the standpoint
of damages. After reviewing the law concerning police power
takings, the constitutional significance of Devines will be analyzed. Second, the note will examine the question of what compensation is just for the taking of plaintiffs' leasehold interests.
The note will conclude with a discussion of the potential impact
Devines could have upon urban housing policy.
THE TAKING CLAUSE AND POLICE
POWER REGULATIONS
The dispute over whether just compensation for a taking of
private property is constitutionally mandated when the govern-

ter 39 of the Magna Carta. It is thought that the Just Compensation clause was included
as an amendment to the United States Constitution at the behest of James Madison who
was anticipating the possibility of populists coming to power and seizing the land and
wealth of moneyed classes. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE
TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE
OWNERS 39-104 (1973).

That the vast majority of "takings" cases involve corporate plaintiffs attempting to
protect their property from governmental interference is noteworthy. See, e.g., San Diego

Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260

U.S. 393 (1922).
8.. The potential for municipal liability is far-reaching. If the measure of compensation
recommended by the plaintiffs in Devines were accepted, each class member could recover up to $4,500.00 over four years in just compensation. See infra notes 125-35 and
accompanying text.
9. 665 F.2d at 149 (Fairchild, J., concurring).
10. Timely appeals' of' the district court's Iorder, Iwhich was entered on January 21,
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ment destroys the value of the property while regulating in the
public interest has raged for sixty years. In Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon," the majority opinion of Justice Holmes and the dissent of Justice Brandeis eloquently articulated both sides of the
issue. Justice Holmes wrote that in certain instances government
must pay just compensation for costs borne by private parties as
a result of valid public regulation. 12 Justice Brandeis counterargued that the fifth amendment only dictates just compensa3
tion when government acquires property for a public purpose.'
Some commentators and courts argue that Justice Brandeis
was correct in concluding that a valid exercise of state police
power can never accomplish a taking. 14 These critics of the Pennsylvania Coal decision look to the Supreme Court case of Mugler
v. Kansas 5 to support their view that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to extend the protection of the "takings
clause" to those economically burdened by valid police power
regulations. The existence of two lines of cases in the area of
police power takings, one inspired by PennsylvaniaCoal and the
other by Mugler, helps to distinguish a non-compensable regulation from a compensable taking, "(t)he lawyer's equivalent of the
6
physician's hunt for the quark."'
Mugler v. Kansas 7 is the leading case holding that police
power regulation of property and governmental acquisition of
property represent differences of kind, the former non-compensable under the fifth amendment and the latter compensable.' 8 In Mugler, a brewery owner challenged a Kansas statute
which made criminal the manufacture or sale of intoxicating
liquors. The brewer claimed that the regulation rendered his business valueless and sought just compensation. The Supreme

1983, were filed with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals by both plaintiffs and
defendants.
11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Pennsylvania Coal has been called, "the keystone of all subsequent 'taking' law." F. BOSSELMAN, D. CAUIES & J. BANTA, supranote 7, at 126.
12. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
13. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. "Although fifty years have passed, it is not too late to recognize that Justice
Brandeis was right." CMZENS ADVISORY COMM. ON ENVTL LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH,

THE USE OF LAND 174-75 (1973). See also Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE _J. 149-50 n.5 (1971).
15. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
16. C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976).
17. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
18. Id. at 669.
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Court denied the claim on the ground that the state law was a
valid police power regulation to abate a public nuisance. 19
The first Justice Harlan reasoned for the Court that the states,
in ratifying the fourteenth amendment, did not intend to bargain
away their inherent police powers. 20 Because public nuisance
abatement was a legitimate exercise of Kansas' police power, the
Court held that a prohibition on use of the brewery did not constitute a taking. 21 For the Court, the fundamental distinction
between a non-compensable police power regulation and a compensable acquisition of property by government was that, when
regulating property, the state was not appropriating property for
its own use as it was in a proceeding to acquire title to property. 22
Mugler established the constitutional principle that police
power regulations abating public nuisances arising on private
property are non-compensable so long as the government does
not acquire title to property. 23 Commentators have termed this
principle the "noxious use" exception to the requirement of just
compensation for a taking. 24 Underlying this exception is the
theory that parties who are at fault for creating a nuisance
should not be able to recover just compensation when the government acts to protect the public from harm for which the private
party is responsible. 25 The Supreme Court has determined that

19. Id.
20. Id. at 664.
21. Id. at 669.
22. Id. Eight years after Mugler, in the case of Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895),
Justice Harlan found a compensable taking occasioned by a Boston ordinance passed

pursuant to Boston's police power. The ordinance authorized Boston to take temporary
title to swampy land for the purpose of filling it in. Justice Harlan found a taking

because the owners were deprived of all use of their property by the regulation, whereas
the brewer in Mugler had the option to convert the brewery into a legal use. Id. at 407.
23. 123 U.S. at 669.
24. See, e.g., Oakes, Property Rights in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L.
REv. 583, 607 (1981); McGinley & Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon Revisited: Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an
Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 TULSA, L.J. 418, 432 (1981); Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1191; Sax, Takings and the PolicePower, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 49 (1964).
25. Michelman, supra note 24, at 1196-1202. The so called "fault rationale" for the
"noxious use" exception to the just compensation clause was established by Justice Harlan in Mugler
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public
is not, and ...cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason
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several types of land-use regulations abating public nuisances
are non-compensable on the basis of the "noxious use" ex26
ception.
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,27 while not reversing Mugler
and its progeny, adopted a different standard for determining
whether a government may confiscate private property under
the aegis of exercising its police power. Pennsylvania Coal
involved a claim by the plaintiff company that Pennsylvania, by
enacting the Kohler Act, a statute barring coal exploration
underneath homes, took the company's property without just
compensation. The Supreme Court found the Kohler Act uncon28
stitutional for its failure to provide just compensation.
Justice Holmes stated the oft-quoted rule: "The general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 29 For
Justice Holmes, the key factors in determining whether a regulation went too far were the extent of the dimunition occasioned by
30
the regulation and the sufficiency of the public interest involved.
In PennsylvaniaCoal, he found that the Kohler Act totally diminished the value of the company's mining rights and that this
dimunition outweighed the public interest in maintaining the
1
Mahon's home. 3

of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury
upon the community. The exercise of the police power by... [the prohibition of a
nuisance, whereby the value of property is depreciated] is very different from taking property for public use... In the one case, a nuisance is only being abated; in

the other an unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner.
123 U.S. at 669.
26. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (no compensation is owed to
owner due to regulation forbidding use of land as a gravel pit); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928) (regulation compelling owner to cut down diseased cedar trees without just
compensation is not a taking); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (regulation
forbidding owner to operate a brickworks is not a taking).
27. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
28. Id. at 416.
29. Id. at 415. The Pennsylvania Coal standard is critiqued by Bosselman, Callies,
and Banta, supra note 7, at 238-39. They contend: 'The idea that too extensive regulation
of the use of land could constitute a taking was an invention of the early twentieth century..." and is not grounded in historical analysis of the Constitution. Id.
30. 260 U.S. at 414.
31. Id. at 414-15. In a famous dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the Just Compensation clause of the fifth amendment protects owners only from the seizure of their fee
interest in land by the government. Valid police power regulations which are appropriate
means to achieve a legitimate public end, in Brandeis' view, could never accomplish a
taking. Id. at 417. Brandeis asserted:
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The Pennsylvania Coal analysis of police power takings, therefore, differs radically from the Mugler analysis. Justice Holmes
did not view governmental acquisition of property and police
power regulations as two separate kinds of government action as
Justice Harlan did. 32 Rather, Justice Holmes placed regulations
affecting private property upon the same continuum as governmental acquisition and measured the compensability of a regula33
tion by its proximity to the acquisition end of the continuum.
Under the Holmes formulation, one whose property loses value
due to regulation has the possibility of recovering just compensation in some instances. In contrast, under Harlan's analysis in
Mugler, the party injured by a valid regulation has no hope of
recovering just compensation.
A spate of municipal zoning and land use regulation in the
1960's and 1970's spawned a number of Supreme Court cases
relying upon Pennsylvania Coal to analyze police power/taking
issues.34 Of these cases Pennsylvania Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City 35 presents the most complete analysis of
the police power/taking issue since Pennsylvania Coal. Penn
Central challenged New York City's Landmark Preservation
Law because, pursuant to the law, New York City denied Penn
Central permission to develop the airspace above Grand Central
Station.3 6 Penn Central contended that the denial constituted a
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed by the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense,
an abridgement by the state of rights in property without just compenstion. But
restriction imposed to protect public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking.
Id.
32. Justice Holmes first framed the issue of whether police power regulation differs
from governmental acquisition of property as a matter of degree or kind when he sat on
the Massachussetts Supreme Court. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889)
(upholding state law prohibiting fences over six feet as a noncompensable police power
regulation). See also Sax, supra note 14, at 149; F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA,
supra note 7, at 321.
33. 260 U.S. at 415.
34. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting and expressing the view of at least five members of the Court as
to the merits); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser-Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
35. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
36. New York City's Landmark Preservation law regulated architectural changes to
structures designated as historic sites. Owners of historic buildings were required to submit any proposed alterations in their structure to a Landmarks Commission for approval.
The Commission denied Penn Central's proposed alteration to Grand Central Station. Id.
at 116-17.
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taking of private property requiring just compensation.
The Supreme Court found no compensable taking because the
regulation did not totally destroy the value of Grand Central
Station to Penn Central. 3 7 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, stated that there is no set formula for determining
when justice and fairness require just compensation in the case
of police power regulation. 38 Echoing Holmes, he labeled the
determination of whether compensation is due an "ad hoc factual inquiry."39 The two key factors in the inquiry are: the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and the charac40
ter of the governmental action.
To prevail on a taking claim, the plaintiff must, according to
Penn Central,demonstrate that the challenged state action completely destroys the reasonable value of the property. 41 While the
character of the governmental action at issue was identified by
the Penn Central Court as an important consideration in determining when a taking occurs, the Court did state in a footnote
that one form of government action, nuisance abatement, may
no longer be entitled to its status as an exception to the requirement of just compensation. 42 The footnote indicates that fault in
creating a nuisance, which was key to the Mugler Court's decision to deny the brewer compensation, should no longer be a jus-

37. 438 U.S. at 137.
38. Id. at 124.
39. Id. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes stated that "the question [of whether a
compensable taking has occurred] depends upon the particular facts." 260 U.S. at 413.
40. 438 U.S. at 124.
41. Id. at 137. The test enunciated in Penn Centralfor determining whether there is a
taking involves two steps: first a court must examine the character of the governmental
regulation to ensure that the regulation in question is a valid means for achieving a
legitimate governmental goal. If the regulation is valid the court proceeds to the second
step which is to determine the nature and extent of the interference with the plaintiff's
"distinct investment-backed expectations." Id. at 124. Compensation is required if the
impact of the regulation is so severe as to destroy the plaintiffs property interest. Id. at
136. The Penn Central test has been applied in five recent Supreme Court cases: San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting
and expressing the view of at least five members of the Court as to the merits) (taking
found when city rezoned utility's land from industrial to recreational use); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (no taking found when city rezoned plaintiffs valuable
development parcels from one structure per acre to one structure per five acres); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (no taking found in requirement that
shopping center owners allow petititioning on their property): Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51 (1979) (no taking found when state law limited the commercial sale of rare bird artifacts): Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (taking found when federal
government required public access to private marina).
42. 438 U.S. at 133 n.30. See supranotes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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tification for denying recovery of compensation in a police
43
power/taking case.
The Penn Centralanalysis was recently applied by the Supreme
44
Court in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.
The City of San Diego rezoned land owned by the plaintiff company from industrial use to recreational use. 45 The company
asserted that the zoning ordinance rendered their investment in
the site valueless and made a fifth amendment claim for just
compensation. The California Court of Appeals, in the spirit of
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal, denied the company's claim and declared that a party deprived of property by a
valid police power regulation is never entitled to just compensation. 46 The company appealed the case to the United States
Supreme Court.
Curiously, Justice Brennan's dissent in the case furnishes the
only discussion of takings law since the majority held that the
case was not ripe for decision. 47 Because a combination of five
concurring and dissenting justices expressed support for Justice
Brennan's treatment of takings law in the dissent, his opinion is
instructive. 48 In his treatment of the merits, Justice Brennan

43. 438 U.S. at 133 n.30. The footnote states that cases denying just compensation
which have been traditionally termed "noxious use" exception cases should not be understood as resting upon the noxious quality of the prohibited use. Rather, compensation
was denied in these cases upon the ground that the restrictions involved were reasonable,
produced a widespread public benefit, and were applicable to all similarly situated property. Id.
44. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
45. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. acquired 412 acres of land in 1966 for the purpose of
constructing a nuclear power plant. In 1973, the San Diego City Council rezoned 39 of the
acres for agricultural use and designated the entire parcel as an open-space area. Under
the city's open-space plan only 50 of the original 412 acres were zoned for industrial use.
46. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 81 Cal. App. 3d 844, 146 Cal. Rptr.
103 (1978). In holding that there can be no taking when the state destroys private property pursuant to a valid police power, the appeals court relied on precedent of the
Supreme Court of California. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), the Supreme Court of California held that the exercise of the state's
police power in the form of valid regulation (in this case a zoning law) could never
accomplish a taking within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth Amendments. 24 Cal.
3d at 272, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
47. A majority of five justices refused to decide the merits of the case on the ground
that San Diego Gas & Electric was not appealing from a final judgment in accord with
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 633. Justice Brennan dissented and was joined by three justices in his argument that the case was ripe for decision. Id. at 639.
48. In his concurring opinion Justice Rehnquist indicated that he agreed with the
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stated that the California finding that regulatory takings are
non-compensable "flatly contradicts clear precedents of this
Court."4 9 He noted that a taking typically involves formal condemnation proceedings and subsequent acquisition of title by a
governmental entity.5 0 Justice Brennan specified, however, that
a taking can occur without governmental acquisition when a
land use regulation destroys a property owner's use or enjoyment
of property in order to promote the public good.5 1 In summary,
he posited: "It is only logical, then, that governmental action
short of eminent domain can be a de facto exercise of the power
of eminent domain, where the effects completely deprive the
'5 2
owner of all or most of his interest in the property.
San Diego Gas & Electric clearly demonstrates that at least
five members of the Court have no desire to overrule or modify
the line of regulatory takings cases that have their origin in
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.53 State and local governments, as
the City of Milwaukee discovered in Devines v. Maier,5 4 will continue to be exposed to liability for just compensation when they
enforce valid land use regulations that render certain property
interests valueless to their owners.
DEVINES V. MMER
The District Court Decision
Devines involved a class action suit brought in federal court
by four tenants forced to vacate their apartments by Milwaukee
building inspectors due to uninhabitable living conditions 5 5 The

position that the case was not ripe for decision by the Supreme Court. Id. at 633. However, Justice Rehnquist went on to write that if he were to reach the merits of the case, he

would "have little difficulty agreeing with what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." Id. On the basis of this expression of support by Justice Rehnquist, the
Brennan dissent has been interpreted as reflecting the thinking of at least five members
of the Court on the issue of police power takings.
49. Id. at 647.
50. Id. at 651.
51. Id. at 652.
52. Id. at 653.
53. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 27-52 and accompanying text.
54. 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
55. Suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin by four named plaintiffs: Delores Devines, Antoinette Stokes, Sarita Beanson,
and Nick Sutherland. The plaintiffs were represented by Lawrence Albrecht, Thomas
Donegan, and Louis Mestre of Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., a grantee of the Legal
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four named plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a class of 390
other predominantly low income, month-to-month tenants who
were forced to vacate their dwellings by Milwaukee authorities
between 1975-1978.56 The class members all resided in communities the City of Milwaukee had targeted for intensive code
enforcement.57 Defendant Maier was sued individually and in
his official capacity as Mayor of Milwaukee. Four other city officials who held housing-related policy-making positions were
58
joined as defendants, as was the City of Milwaukee itself.

Plaintiffs' primary claim was that defendants' order to vacate
pursuant to state and local laws violated plaintiffs' fifth amendment rights by taking their leasehold interests for a public purpose without just compensation. 59 Upon the defendants' motion
for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' taking claim, however,
60
the district court dismissed the case.
Although the court accepted the plaintiffs' view that leasehold

Services Corporation.
56. The certified class consisted of "all tenants who are or will be displaced from their
homes by order of the Milwaukee Department of Building and Safety Engineering
(BI/SE) who fail to receive financial compensation to which they are legally entitled."
Brief for the Appellant at 3, Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
57. Pursuant to Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1976), Milwaukee received Community Development Block Grant
funds for use to improve targeted low income communities. Milwaukee allocated a portion
of these funds for an Intensive Code Enforcement Program (ICEP). In addition, Milwaukee funded a companion project to ICEP, the Code Enforcement Relocation Project
(CERP). CERP funding was only available to tenants who were forced to move because
their building was to be demolished. The plaintiffs in Devines were tenants who were
forced to vacate their apartments as a result of ICEP but were ineligible for CERP relocation funding because their buildings had not deteriorated enough to be demolished. Brief
for the Appellant at 8-9, Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
58. The four city officials joined as defendants were: Wallace Burkee, Director of the
Community Development Agency; William Drew, Commissioner of the Department of
City Development; Gerald Anderson, Department of City Development Relocation Officer;
and Leonard Sloane, Deputy Inspector of Buildings.
59. The plaintiffs also made a claim for just compensation under § 32.19 of the Wisconsin Statutes which provides, in pertinent part:
The legislature declares that it is in the public interest that persons displaced by
any public project be fairly compensated by payment for the property acquired...
as the result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.
Wis. STAT. §§ 32.19 (1977).
In addition, due to the fact that Milwaukee displaced the plaintiffs through the implementation of a federally-funded cede enforcement program, the plaintiffs made a claim
for federal relocation benefits. The plaintiffs claimed this statutory right of recovery
under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976) [hereinafter cited as URA].
60. 494 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Wis. 1980).

19831

Devines v. Maier

interests are compensable property interests within the meaning
of the fifth amendment, the value of which were effectively destroyed by the city's action in vacating the buildings, 6 1 on the
strength of Mugler v. Kansas,62 it determined that the destruction of a recognized property right did not give rise to a claim for
just compensation. 63 Chief Judge Reynolds viewed Milwaukee's
action as a valid exercise of its police power to abate a nuisance
which could never be compensable regardless of the extent to
which the state action destroyed a valid property interest. 64 He
stated that the burden of paying just compensation was not
required because such payment would deter governments from
65
fulfilling their obligation to protect public safety.
The chief judge buttressed his position with two arguments.
First, he found that building code regulations could not take private property because the intent of such regulations was not to
appropriate private property but to protect public health and
safety.66 Second, Chief Judge Reynolds pointed out that building
owners are not compensated when their buildings are razed or
vacated due to code violations. He saw no reasons why tenants
67
should be treated any differently.
The Seventh CircuitOpinion: The ConstitutionalIssue
The tenants appealed the district court's decision to the Seventh Circuit. They contended that the district court erred in holding that a taking can never occur when property is destroyed by
the valid exercise of a state police power. 6 In addition, the
plaintiffs claimed that they were victims of a taking and, as a
consequence, Milwaukee owed them damages. The appellate
61.

Id. at 995. For a discussion of the compensability of leasehold interests under the

fifth amendment, see Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); United
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945). See also P. NICHOLS, 2 EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.23 (3d ed. 1975).

62. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
63. Devines, 494 F. Supp. at 995.
64. Id.
65. Id. In so concluding the district court relied on the finding of Justice Harlan in
Mugler v. Kansas that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to provide citizens
with a means of challenging the nearly plenary state police power. See supra text accompanying notes 17-25. It should be noted that the district court decision in Devines was
rendered before the Supreme Court's decision in San Diego Gas & Electric. See supra text
accompanying notes 44-52.
66. Devines, 494 F. Supp. at 995.
67. Id.
68. Brief for Appellant at 10, Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).

744

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

court reversed the lower court's finding that valid police power
regulations could never take private property and reached the
merits of the plaintiffs' fifth amendment claim. 69 The
court found that the plaintiffs' fifth amendment right to just
compensation for a taking of private property had been violated
by the defendants.7 0 The appellate panel then remanded the
case to the district court to determine the appropriate measure of
71
just compensation.
The Seventh Circuit unequivocally rejected the argument made
famous by the Brandeis dissent in Pennsylvania Coal and reiterated by the district court that valid police power regulations
can never take private property. 72 The court relied upon San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego73 to support its
view that in some instances the enforcement of police power regulations can constitute compensable de facto takings of private
property. 74 The standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit to determine when a de facto taking has occurred was the "extent of
diminution" in value test utilized by the Supreme Court in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.75 According to
the Seventh Circuit, when a regulation interferes totally with an
owner's use and enjoyment of a valid property interest there is a
76
compensable regulatory taking.
The appellate court also held that the district court's arguments concerning intent and the inability of landlords to recover
just compensation were unfounded. First, Milwaukee's intent in

69.

665 F.2d at 142. The case was decided by a panel of three circuit judges consisting

of John W. Peck, Senior Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (sitting by
designation), Judge Thomas Fairchild, and the late Judge Robert Sprecher. Judge Peck
wrote the opinion for the court. Judge Fairchild filed a concurring opinion.
70. Id. at 146.
71. See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
72. 665 F.2d at 142. See supra note 31.
73. 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting and expressing the view of at least
five members of the Court as to the merits).
74. Devines, 665 F.2d at 142.
75. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See supranote 41.
76. Id. The Seventh Circuit cited San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, to
support this legal principle. The San Diego Court, in turn, relied upon the test developed
in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N. Y. The Penn Central test is outlined supra note
41. When the Penn Central test is applied to the Devines fact situation, it is clear that a
compensable taking was accomplished by the city's vacate order. The vacate order interfered totally with the tenants' "distinct investment-backed expectations" because the
tenants' property interest was completely destroyed by the state action. Once the vacate
order was entered, their tenancy was destroyed.
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passing a housing code was irrelevant because a taking of property is measured by what government does, not what it intends. 77
Second, whether a landlord would be able to recover just compensation if the city vacated her building was irrelevant to the
Seventh Circuit. The court viewed the respective property rights
of landlords and tenants as distinct. The impact of a vacate
order upon tenants and landlords must be separately considered,
according to the Seventh Circuit, because the order causes tenants
to lose their property interest while landlords retain a residual
78
interest in the property itself.
In treating the merits of the case, the Seventh Circuit first
considered whether the plaintiffs possessed a legitimate property
interest in light of the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs
had no legally cognizable property interest taken by the city. 79
The defendants alleged that the fifth amendment only compensates holders of valid leases and that plaintiffs' leases were
invalid because the city inspectors' determination of uninhabitability made continued occupancy of the apartments illegal pur80
suant to state law.
The court found that the defendants' argument could not be
accepted without "obliterating the Fifth Amendment protection

77. Id. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (Stewart, J., concurring): "[The
Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a state says, or by what it
intends, but by what it does." Id. (emphasis in original).
In finding that police power regulations can take private property regardless of the
state's intent, the Seventh Circuit did not distinguish Mugler v. Kansas. In Mugler, the
Supreme Court relied on the fact that Kansas' law prohibiting liquor production was not
designed to acquire property but to abate a public nuisance. Because the state did not
intend to acquire title to property through the operation of the anti-liquor law, no compensable taking was found.
78. Devines, 665 F.2d at 142. The distinction between the respective property rights of
landlords and tenants is best understood in the context of the Supreme Court's concept of
property rights. In analyzing the impact of a particular regulation upon a recognized
property interest the Court attributes to the owner of the property a "bundle of property
rights." See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56 (1979). This bundle is comprised of
"strands" of property interests. Id. Owners of improved real property, for example, have a
variety of "strands" in their "bundle" of rights. They have an interest in the land itself,
an interest in structures on the land and an interest in rents flowing from the property.
Tenants, on the other hand, have only one "strand," their leasehold, in the "bundle" of
property rights their tenancy represents. See also Michelman, supra note 24, at 1230-33.
79. Devines, 665 F.2d at 143.
80. Brief of the Appellee at 3, Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981). Defendants cited New Orleans Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1929) (ordinance compelling utility to tear down dangerous bridge was not a taking), to support
their contention that there can be no taking when the regulation in question regulates an
illegal use.
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against regulatory takings that benefit the public at the expense
of the individual." 81 All police power regulations, the court reasoned, make certain uses of property "illegal."8 2 If the defendants' view were to be adopted, the court believed that no person
unfairly burdened by a police power regulation would ever be
83
compensated.
Having determined that the city's action affected a legitimate
property interest of the plaintiffs, the court then resolved the
essential issue of whether a compensable taking had occurred.
Guided by the Penn Central Court's emphasis upon the extent to
which the challenged regulation interfered with private property,
the Seventh Circuit found a taking in this instance.8 4 By forcing
the plaintiffs to move, the city's vacate order totally destroyed
their legitimate property interest. Once the city acted to vacate
an apartment the tenant's right to occupy the premises was
taken, leaving the tenant with no legal claim to occupancy. The
majority stated, "the tenants whose right to occupy the premises
is extinguished has nothing left and the impact of the regulation
85
on his or her rights could not be more severe."
The final issue the court addressed in considering the plaintiffs' constitutional claim concerned the question of whether the
tenants' property interest was taken for a public purpose as the
fifth amendment requires. The defendants argued that no compensation was due to the plaintiffs because the vacate order was

81. Devines, 665 F.2d at 143.
82. In Pennsylvania-Coal v. Mahon, for example, the Kohler Act made it illegal for
the coal company to exercise its right to mine coal below the Mahon's home. This fact did
not preclude the company from having a right to just compensation. See also KaiserAetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
83. The defendants attempted to distinguish the Devines case from other regulatory taking cases involving "illegal uses" on the ground that the tenants had notice, prior
to the posting of vacate orders, that their apartments were uninhabitable. 665 F.2d at
143. City and state laws prohibiting occupancy of uninhabitable dwellings, defendants
alleged, provided notice to the tenants of their "illegal use." Accordingly, in the defendants' view, these laws served to extinguish the tenants' property rights at the moment the
apartment in question became uninhabitable, not at the time the authorities declared
them uninhabitable. Id.
The court found this argument wanting because the laws that defendants claimed
provided prior notice to the tenants were not self-executing. The laws in question provided for a determination of uninhabitability at the discretion of the building inspector.
Id. at 144. The court held that until a proper authority (in this case, a building inspector)
made a formal judgment of uninhabitablility and notified the tenants of this finding, the
plaintiffs possessed a legally cognizable property interest. Id.
84. Id. at 142.
85. Id.

19831

Devines v. Maier

747

of primary benefit to the plaintiffs and of only incidental benefit
to the public.8 6 The Seventh Circuit termed this assertion "overt
paternalism."8 7 Relying upon the statement of purpose of Milwaukee's housing code, 88 the court found that the city terminated plaintiffs' valid leasehold rights to occupy their homes in
order to promote the public good.8 9
The ConstitutionalImplications of Devines
In Penn Central,Justice Brennan noted that the character of
challenged governmental action in a taking claim was a factor
of particular importance in determining whether a compensable
taking has occurred. 90 The Devines decision is constitutionally
significant because the character of the government action at
issue, namely the valid enforcement of building code regulations,
involved an essential governmental function in abating public
nuisances in the area of housing. 9 1 Traditionally, such government action has been held to be non-compensable on the strength
of the "noxious use" exception to the taking clause. 92 The Devines
decision is a clear indication that at least one federal circuit considers this exception, first articulated in Mugler v. Kansas,93 to
no longer be good law.

86.
87.

Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 144.

88. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 51. The Statement of Purpose links the
enactment of the housing code with the prevention of urban deterioration. For a discussion of the public purpose of housing codes and of code enforcement, see generally
Grigsby, Economic Aspects of Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URB. LAW. 533 (1971); Mandelker, Housing Codes, Building Demolition, andJust Compensation:A Rationalefor the
Exercise of Public Power over Slum Housing, 67 MICH. L. REv. 635 (1969); Meeks, Oudekerk & Sherman, Housing Code Dilemmas, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 297 (1978).
89. Devines, 665 F.2d at 146. The court noted that the city's enforcement program
placed the burden of moving on those members of the community who had "little or no
choice but to live in low cost, often substandard housing." Id. In rejecting the defendants'
contention that the plaintiffs benefited from the city's action, the court pointed out that
in some cases the named plaintiffs were forced to leave their homes immediately while
others were given 72 hours or seven days to leave. Some of those who failed to comply
because they could not find new housing were criminally prosecuted. Id. at 144. One
family forced to move could not afford to pay for movers and moved their belongings in
20 trips in the snow with the aid of a child's coaster wagon. Brief for the Appellant at 5,
Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
90. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
91. See, e.g., Grigsby, supranote 88; Meeks, Oudekerk, & Sherman, supranote 88.
92. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
93. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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The district court in Devines relied upon Mugler to support its
conclusion that a valid police power regulation to abate a public
nuisance could never take private property.9 4 The Seventh Circuit failed even to distinguish Mugler or other "noxious use"
cases in holding that it is the impact of building code regulation
upon the tenant's property interest, not the intent of the regulation to protect public safety, which is dispositive in finding a
taking. The Seventh Circuit did not find the character of the
government action to be an important consideration. Rather, the
economic impact of the regulation upon the tenants' property
interest in and of itself was determinative in finding a taking.
The Seventh Circuit's emphasis upon the economic impact of
the regulation, and its relative lack of concern for the character
of the government action involved, can be traced to the court's
reliance upon Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego95 for guidance in the area of
police power takings. This dissent is crucial to the development
of takings law because it measures de facto police power takings
solely by the extent to which the regulation deprives the owner
of his or her interest in the property.9 6 The fact that the Seventh
Circuit followed the San Diego Gas & Electric dissent is a sign
that this dissent will have an important impact upon takings
97
law.
By eliminating the character of the regulation in question
from consideration in determining a police power taking, San
Diego Gas & Electric and Devines signal the demise of the "noxious use" exception precursed by the Supreme Court in the Penn
Central case.9 8 Apparently, if Devines is followed, governments
will not be shielded from liability for just compensation resulting
from regulations that abate public nuisances. Unfortunately, the
failure of the Seventh Circuit to distinguish Mugler, a case that
has never been overruled by the Supreme Court, makes a more
definite statement difficult to make. Until the Supreme Court

94. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
95. 450 U.S. 621, 639 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting and expressing the view of at
least five members of the Court as to the merits).
96, Id. at 652.
97. One commentator has stated that the San Diego Gas & Electric dissent enshrined the concept of de facto police power takings as the takings law of the 1980's.
Oakes, supra note 24, at 620. See also Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court
Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND. LJ. 45 (1982).
98. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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clarifies the continuing validity of Mugler the law of police
power takings will remain somewhat uncertain.
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF
JUST COMPENSATION
The majority opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Devines was
limited to the consideration of whether the plaintiffs possessed a
constitutional right to just compensation. The crucial task of
determining the appropriate measure of just compensation was
delegated to the district court for decision on remand. 99 Insight
into the measurement of damages was given by Judge Fairchild
in his concurring opinion. 10 0 Judge Fairchild concluded his discussion of damages by noting that the amount of damages "may
not amount to very much."'' 1 The Devines decision will be of
little practical importance to tenants or municipalities if Judge
Fairchild's observation is correct. A review of the legal principles
governing just compensation for the taking of a leasehold interest will provide a framework for understanding the competing
arguments put forth by the parties in Devines on the issue of
damages.
The Law of Just Compensation
The Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional requirements for measuring just compensation derive as much from the
basic equitable principles of fairness as they do from the technical concepts of property law. 0 2 Because the fifth amendment
provides no definite standards of fairness to measure just compensation, the Court has adopted practical standards to do substantial justice. 0 3 The two primary standards the Court has

99. See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
100. In addressing the issue of just compensation, Judge Fairchild identified what he
considered to be the elements of a month-to-month tenant's compensation. These elements were: the right to occupy the premises for the balance of the month when the
vacate order is entered and for the succeeding month (subject to the payment of rent),
moving costs, and the costs of locating comparable living quarters. In addition, a tenant
may be able to show a value for the probability of staying in the future (subject to the
payment of rent) and for the loss of potential damages for poor conditions recoverable
from the landlord which the tenant is losing by moving. Devines, 665 F.2d at 149 (Fairchild, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).
103. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
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developed are fair market value and indemnification.
Fair market value is a technical concept of property law which
measures the value gained by the party who acquires the property in question. 10 4 Indemnification, on the other hand, is an
equitable principle which measures the economic loss suffered by
the owner of the property acquired.10 5 Although the Supreme Court
has applied both standards in different cases to measure the
value of a leasehold interest, the fair market value standard is
considered the traditional measure of just compensation. 10 6
The fair market value of a leasehold interest is its bonus value
over the unexpired term. 107 This measure of value is computed
by determining the present or discounted value of the amount by
which the market rental for the balance of the term exceeds the
tenant's rental obligation for the period.' 08 If the market rental

104. Fair market value in the context of a leasehold has been defined as "the amount
of money which a purchaser willing but not obligated to buy the property would pay to
an owner willing but not obligated to sell it, taking into consideration all the uses to
which the land was suited and might in reason be applied." 4 P. NICHOtS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.2 [1](1981).

105. The theory of indemnification in the context of just compensation for a leasehold,
while not susceptible to precise definition, has been best expressed by the Supreme Court
as "the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. Owners are to be put
in as good position pecuniarily as they would have occupied if their property had not
been taken." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 at 373 (1943). See also United States v.
New River Colleries, 262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923); Seabord Airline Ry. v. United States, 261
U.S. 299, 304 (1923).
For discussions of the two approaches to measuring just compensation in a leasehold
context, see generally Bigham, FairMarket Value, "Just Compensation," and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND L. REv. 63 (1970); Jones, Just Compensation Via Fair
Market Value May Not Include the Kitchen Sink-It Could Be Noncompensable," 75
MISS. L.J. 1 (1975); Leary & Turner, The Injustice of "Just Compensation" to Fixed
Income Recipients-Does Recent Relocation Legislation Fill the Void?, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 1
(1974); Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 765 (1973).

Kanner best articulated the "fundamental clash" between the principles of fair market
value and indemnification when he wrote: "Does the compensation payable to the owner
represent a monetary equivalent of what the taker acquires, or does the word 'just' import
into the economic equation an ethical principle requiring that the owner be indemnified
for the economic detriment caused to him or her by the taking." Kanner, supra,at 781.
106. Jones, supra note 105, at 3; Pinsky, Relocation Payments in Urban Renewal:
More Just Compensation, 11 N.Y.L.F. 80 (1965). The cases representative of the majority
rule that fair market value is the appropriate measure of just compensation are: Alamo
Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14
(1970); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). Cases holding
that indemnification is appropriate as a standard for determining just compensation are:
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
107. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supranote 6, at 504.
108. Id.
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value of the leasehold does not exceed the agreed upon rent, the
lease has no compensable value. 10 9 Consequential damages suffered by the leaseholder, such as moving expenses, are not re0
coverable under the fair market value standard."
Indemnification for the loss of a leasehold, in contrast, involves
no rigid formula for determining damages."' Courts will indemnify tenants for their losses, in some cases, when the fair
market value standard would leave the tenant with no recovery.
The purpose of indemnification is to ensure that victims of takings are left in the same position as they would have been absent
a taking.1 ' 2 Therefore, consequential damages flowing from the
3
taking are recoverable under the indemnification standard. 1
Many commentators have noted that the fair market value
standard of formulating just compensation is anything but fair
when utilized to value the leasehold of an urban, residential
tenant.11 4 The standard has become inapplicable in urban settings, the commentators contend, for several reasons. First, the
urban housing market is not a true arms-length market in which
landlords and tenants bargain on equal footing to arrive at a
fair rent."15 Second, the fair market value of a month-to-month
tenancy in a substandard building in most cases will not exceed
the rent reserved in the lease." 6 Consequently, the tenant will be
109. L. ORGEL, 1 VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 126 (2d ed. 1953).
110. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 515.
111. See supra note 105.
112. There is precedent for the application of the principle of indemnification for the
taking of a leasehold interest. United States v. General Motors, Inc., 323 U.S. 373 (1944).
Cf. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946). In the General Motors case the
Supreme Court stated:
In the ordinary case, for want of a better standard, market value, so called, is the
criterion of that value (the value which will return the aggrieved party to the status
quo). In some cases this criterion cannot be used either because the interest condemned has no market value or because, in the circumstances, market value furnishes an inappropriate measure of actual value.
323 U.S. at 379.
113. In United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1944), the Supreme Court
awarded General Motors damages to indemnify the company for the moving costs it
incurred as a result of the taking of its lease.
114. See e.g. Bigham, supra note 105, at 65; Jones, supra note 105, at 6; Kanner, supra
note 105, at 780; Pinsky, supra note 106, at 80. Pinsky wrote: "The traditional rule [of
market value as the standard for just compensation] has had a particularly inequitable
impact on tenants." Id.
115. Leary & Turner, supra note 105, at 12. For a comprehensive analysis of the
inequality in bargaining power between urban tenants and landlords, see Javins v. First
National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
116. Leading authorities in the area of eminent domain law contend that month-to-
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left with no recovery. 117 Third, the fair market value standard
excludes recovery for consequential damages which flow from a
taking, such as moving expenses and the cost of finding new
housing. 118 In most cases consequential damages form the bulk
of the damages suffered by the urban tenant. Fourth, the fair
market value standard does not compensate urban tenants for
their expectancy interest in continual use and enjoyment of the
premises pursuant to their fulfillment of leasehold obligations.' 1 9
While courts have not abandoned the fair market value standard in the urban housing context, Congress and state legislatures have recognized the injustice to displaced tenants inherent
in the fair market value measure of just compensation. In response to the inequity of the fair market value standard in the
urban context, relocation acts that indemnify tenants for the
losses suffered from the taking of their leasehold interests have
been passed. 20 One commentator has argued that the various
relocation acts are an attempt by the legislatures to fill the "gap"

month tenancies are non-compensable per se. Nichols writes: "As a practical matter a

tenant from month-to-month suffers only nominal damage upon a taking for public use
and compensation has been rightfully denied in such a case, since a month-to-month
tenant has no unexpired term." 12 P. NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 788 (3d ed. 1981).
Accord M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 505.
117. The phenomenon of fair market value being less than the rent is termed a "negative leasehold." See Note, Condemnation, Compensation, and Negative Leaseholds, 43
FORDHAm L. REV. 841, 842 (1975). Negative leaseholds are likely in month-to-month
tenancies for substandard housing because poor building conditions tend to make a lease
of little value in the "marketplace."

118.

United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 379 (1946) (moving expenses not

awarded). Cf. United States v. General Motors, Inc., 323 U.S. 373, 381 (1944) (moving

expenses awarded because taking was temporary). See Note, Compensation for Moving
Expenses of Personal Property in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 749
(1969).

119.

See Comment, The Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code: A Bittersweet Nostrum

for the Residential Tenant, 84 Dick. L. Rev. 499, 509 (1980); Pinsky, supra note 106, at 81.
Pinsky argued that the fundamental flaw in the fair market value standard is jurisprudential because the common law has not placed any value upon rootedness. Id.

120.

Congress addressed the issue of inadequate just compensation for tenants in tak-

ings cases by passing the URA, supra note 59. The URA establishes standardized pay-

ments to persons displaced by federally-assisted programs. For a discussion of the statutory benefits offered to displaced tenants under the URA, see infra note 124 and
accompanying text.
The following law review articles analyze various aspects of the URA: Goldstein,
Human Values and Relocation Assistance: At the Crossroads, 7 B.C. ENV. AFFAIRS L.

REV. 463 (1979); Comment, Uniform Relocation Act: A Viable Solution to the Plightof the
Displaced, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 552 (1976); Note, Recent Developments in Urban Redevelopment, 21 URB. LAW ANN. 317, 363 (1981); Note, Uniform Relocation Act Does Not Apply

to PrivateDeveloper with Eminent Domain Powers, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 1140.
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between the tenant's actual damages resulting from a taking,
and the minimal protection the fair market value standard of
just compensation affords tenants. 121 The Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970 (URA) 122 is

the model for many state relocation enactments. 23. The URA
compensates tenants for the damages suffered as a consequence
of their involuntary displacement. 124
Significantly, none of the elements of compensation mandated
by the URA are recoverable when the fair market value standard of just compensation is applied. This demonstrates the radical difference between the common law approach to just compensation and the recent legislative response which indemnifies
tenants for the losses they suffer due to takings. To a large
extent the significance of the Devines case will depend upon the
issue of whether the Seventh Circuit will see fit to abandon the
fair market value standard of just compensation in favor of indemnification.
The District Court's Formulationof Damages on Remand
After considering memoranda and oral argument on the question of damages owed to the tenants, the district court entered an

All 50 states and the District of Columbia have passed statutes authorizing various
types of relocation assistance to displaced persons. These statutes vary widely in the
scope of their coverage. In 1976, over half of the states had relocation statutes that did
not require relocation payments when people were displaced by state or local governmental activity involving no federal assistance. Pearlman & Baar, Beyond the Uniform Relocation Act: DisplacementBy State and Local Government, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 329,
330 (1976). For a chart outlining the provisions of each state's relocation laws, see id. at
344-45. Pearlman and Baar's study revealed that the relocation statutes of nine states
and the District of Columbia specify that persons displaced as a result of cede enforcement are eligible for relocation assistance. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 111-2 (1976). Ten
states specifically excluded code enforcement displacees from coverage.
121. Jones, supra note 105, at 6. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in upholding the
validity of Wisconsin's relocation assistance law, noted that: "Many states, realizing the
injustice of denying recovery for other than the fair market value of the physical property
actually taken, have created statutes such as § 32.19 (Wisconsin's relocation statute)."
Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271,279,177 N.W.2d 380, 385 (1970).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976).
123. For example, approximately four-fifths of the states have adopted the URA's
definition of a "displaced person." Pearlman & Baar, supra note 120, at 330.
124. Tenants are displaced within the meaning of the URA when they move: "... as a
result of the acquisition of... real property... or a written order of the acquiring agency
to vacate." 42 U.S.C. § 4601(a) (1976).
The URA provides displaced tenants with compensation for moving expenses of not
more than $300.00 and a "dislocation allowance" of $200.00. 42 U.S.C. § 4622 (1976). In
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order governing the payment of just compensation. 125 The order
can only be adequately described as inconsistent and confusing.
One paragraph of the order called upon the defendants to pay
the measure of damages that the plaintiffs had proposed. According to this paragraph, the defendants were to pay damages of up
to $4,500.00 over four years to each displaced tenant pursuant to
Wisconsin's relocation law. 126 Another paragraph of the same
order specified that the defendants' proposed measure of just
compensation should be the basis for determining damages. If
the defendants' formula were followed, the tenants would recover
much less than the relocation statute provides. 12 7
These conflicting provisions within the same order left the
parties with very little guidance on the issue of damages, and
both plaintiffs and defendants have filed appeals to the Seventh
Circuit for clarification. 128 A discussion of the arguments made
by the parties before the district court on remand provides
insight into the important issues currently before the Seventh

Circuit.
Plaintiffs called for the application of the Wisconsin relocation
statute as the basis for just compensation on the ground that the
court should be guided by the public policy enunciated by elected

addition, tenants who have occupied their apartments for at least 90 days prior to the
commencement of federal acquisition are eligible for a rental subsidy to enable them to
rent safe, decent replacement housing. The replacement housing allowance is not to
exceed $4,000.00 nor is it to be paid for more than four years. 42 U.S.C. § 4624 (1976).
Tenants are aided in locating relocation housing through the provision of relocation
advisory services. 42 U.S.C. § 4625 (1976).
In Devines, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs' claim for relocation assistance
under the URA, see supra note 59, because the court did not consider the plaintiffs to be
"displaced persons" within the meaning of the statute. The court, relying on Alexander v.
HUD, 441 U.S. 39 (1979), held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to URA benefits
because their property was not acquired by the federal government. Devines, 665 F.2d at
146.
125. Order, C.A. No. 78-C-742, entered January 21, 1983 (E.D. Wis.).
126. WIs. STATS. § 32.19 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as § 32.19]. In Devines, § 32.19
formed the basis of the plaintiffs' state constitutional claim of a taking which the district
court heard under its pendent jurisdiction. See supra note 59. The district court held for
the defendants on this claim for the same reasons the court denied plaintiffs' claim under
the United States Constitution. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the ground that § 32.19
was Wisconsin's legislative implementation of the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Devines, 665 F.2d at 146.
The relevant subsections of § 32.19 outlining the benefits to persons eligible under the
act are § 32.19(3)(b) (moving expenses and relocation allowance of up to $500.00) and
§ 32.19(4X3Xb) (replacement housing allowance of up to $4000.00).
127. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 10.
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officials to fairly compensate households displaced by public
programs. 129 Furthermore, the plaintiffs contended that the court
should follow the legislative formula of the relocation law so that
public officials could accurately assess the costs of pursuing pub30
lic programs with some degree of accuracy.
Defendants vigorously opposed plaintiffs' contention that the
state relocation law provided the applicable measure of just
compensation.' 3' They argued that the statute is only applicable
when the government acquires property. If the government
deprives owners of the beneficial use of their property, but does
not acquire title to it, defendants contend that compensation is
32
not due under the state relocation law.
As an alternative to recovery under state law, defendants pro33
posed a formula of just compensation for "eligible tenants"'
which included some of the elements of compensation proposed
by Judge Fairchild in his concurring opinion: the difference in
rent for the unexpired lease term between the rent in the vacated
building and the rental for the new premises, moving costs and
costs incurred in the search for new housing.' 34 The defendants'
proposed formula goes beyond the narrow confines of the fair
market value standard by compensating tenants for some consequential damages. However, the proposal falls far short of the
compensation available under the state relocation law because
the rent differential offered by the defendants is only available
for the unexpired lease term (usually one month), whereas the

129. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Just
Compensation at 2-5, Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Plaintiffs' Memorandum].
130. Id.
131. Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Just Compensation, Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Defendants' Brief].
132. Id. at 21. Defendants supported their argument by pointing out that the language
of § 32.19 parallels the language of the URA. See supra notes 59, 124. Because the
Supreme Court has stated, in Alexander v. HUD, 444 U.S. 39 (1979), that URA benefits
are not recoverable when the government does not acquire property, defendants contended that recovery should not be permitted under § 32.19. Defendants' Brief, supranote
131, at 23.
133. Defendants would deny any recovery to tenants living in buildings that any
reasonable person would find to be uninhabitable. Defendants' Brief, supra note 131, at
25-27. Defendants would also automatically deny compensation to any tenant found to be
responsible for the dilapidated condition of their apartment. Id.
134. Id.
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relocation statute provides rent differential payments for up to
35
four years.1
Analysis of the Just Compensation Debate
It is likely that the plaintiffs argued for application of state
relocation law in order to avoid the harsh impact of the federal
136 It is
common law of just compensation upon urban tenants.
highly unlikely that the market value of the plaintiffs' leases
would exceed the value of the rent reserved in their lease at the
time of the taking. Consequently, if the common law were applied by the court, the plaintiffs would in all likelihood recover
nothing.
The most significant aspect of the just compensation debate in
Devines is that the defendants' proposed measure of just compensation offers more to the plaintiffs than would be provided at
common law. Instead of arguing that the plaintiffs should only
recover the fair market value of their lease, the defendants proposed that consequential damages (for moving expenses and the
cost of seeking new housing) be paid as well. The inclusion of
consequential damages by the defendants signals a recognition
by those responsible for compensating the plaintiffs that payment of fair market value alone is not sufficient. While the
defendants' proposed formula will not indemnify tenants for all
losses flowing from their displacement, it will give the Seventh
Circuit the opportunity to abandon fair market value as the
37
urban tenant's sole measure of just compensation.'
The plaintiffs' proposal that Wisconsin's relocation statute
provides the appropriate measure for just compensation is also
significant and would have substantial consequences if adopted.
Most importantly, plaintiffs would be eligible for benefits of up to

135. See supra note 126.
136. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
137. One law raview article notes that the judiciary has lagged behind the legislative
branch in acknowledging and rectifying the injustice the fair market value standard
represents to urban tenants. The authors wrote:
Significantly, the response [to indemnify tenants] had to be legislative. The ponderous process of judicial reform requires imaginative advocacy on the part of
those representing the poor. It costs money to litigate in the highest courts in the
land, and until recently, such services were not available at a price which the poor
could pay.
Leary & Turner, supra note 105, at 37.
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$4,500.00 over a four year period. 13 8 Such a result would add credence to the defendants' claim that payment of just compensation would have a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of valid
police power regulations. 139 Second, by adopting the statutory
formula the court would abandon the common law. Implicit in
this abandonment would be a judicial determination that the
common law of fair market value is unfair to urban residential

tenants.

140

Regardless of whether the Seventh Circuit adopts the plaintiffs' or the defendants' formulation of just compensation, that
the plaintiffs will, at a minimum, recover the fair market value
of their leases and some consequential damages appears clear.
For plaintiffs living at or near the poverty level, as so many displacees are, this recovery will be of great importance.14 ' For municipalities, the payment of just compensation will create new
administrative and fiscal burdens in a time when public resources are increasingly scarce. For the first time, cities in circuits
following Devines will be forced to plan for a cost attached to the
valid enforcement of building codes.
THE IMPACT OF DEVINES UPON URBAN HOUSING POLICY
The Devines decision will alter the housing policies of municipalities in circuits where the decision is followed. For most large
cities the power to vacate substandard dwellings is an important
sanction in strategies to "improve" the quality of urban housing

138. See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
140. The abandonment of common law formulations of just compensation for statutory formulations would break with precedent established by the Supreme Court in 1893.

In the case of Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), the
Supreme Court held that the determination of the measure of just compensation is for the
judiciary, not the legislature. Id. at 327. The Court reasoned that because the legislative
branch passes laws that take property, it would be a conflict of interest for the legislature
also to set the level of just compensation. Id. The implication is that the legislatures
would be inclined to set artificially low measures of compensation. Ironically, the judiciary has been the one to cling to the fair market value standard of just compensation,
while the legislatures have tended to abandon fair market value in the leasehold context
as an artificially low standard. See supra note 137.
141. See supra note 89. The availability of attorneys at no charge is essential if claims
under Devines are to be pursued as most tenants displaced by code enforcement cannot
afford private counsel. It is quite probable that tenants who are forced to move from
substandard housing will be eligible for free legal services from Legal Services Corporation grantees or other free legal service programs.
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stock. 142 Municipalities will have a financial incentive, after
Devines, to utilize other sanctions short of vacating buildings to
maintain safe and sanitary housing.
One of the less drastic sanctions available to municipalities is
efficient and vigorous code enforcement in the early stages of
building deterioration. Such enforcement of the building code
may be complemented by ordinances that attempt to guarantee
code compliance. For example, rent withholding ordinances and
ordinances authorizing the city to make essential system repairs
at the negligent landowner's expense may help prevent buildings from falling into disrepair. 143 In addition, municipalities
may provide for the appointment of receivers to manage buildings that owners have allowed to deteriorate. Finally, a strictly
enforced system of fines against recalcitrant landlords may be

instituted.

144

Municipalities, as the Devines case itself indicates, will strongly oppose efforts by tenants to bring claims for just compensation. 45 Governments are likely to view the exposure to potential

142. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration,
56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1976).
143. For a comprehensive discussion of code enforcement alternatives designed to
improve building conditions while maintaining occupancy, see generally Abbott, supra
note 142, 1-138. Abbott critiques vacate orders as a tool in urban housing policy:
The order to vacate . . . is a drastic remedy; it removes dwelling units from the
housing stock, temporarily or permanently, and leaves the tenants homeless.
Unless the community has standard relocation housing into which displaced families can move, their eviction may be politically unpopular and futile in improving
their housing conditions.
Id. at 49-50.
144. Id.
145. A claim for just compensation under Devines has been brought in Chicago
involving a tenant who was forced by the City of Chicago to vacate her federally subsidized apartment. City of Chicago v. Goldstein & Williams, No. 82-2562 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982).
The trial court, which entered the vacate order, denied Williams' claim leave to just compensation. Williams has appealed the denial of leave to file her taking claim to the Illinois Court of Appeals, First District, where it is currently pending. Williams is represented by The Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago.
In this case, one issue on appeal of widespread significance is whether the Devines
decision is applicable to cases involving vacate orders entered by a judge rather than by
an administrative authority (as in Devines). This issue is important because most municipalities, including Chicago, enter the vast majority of their vacate orders through judicial process as opposed to administrative authority. In Chicago, for example, vacate
orders are entered pursuant to the Illinois Municipal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 24 11-13-15
(1981). This statute grants the circuit courts jurisdiction to utilize equitable power to prevent the occupancy of buildings in violation of local housing codes. If judicial vacate
orders are found to be outside the scope of the Devines decision, the impact of the decision
will be diminished.
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liability as imposing a "chilling effect" upon their nearly plenary

Devines involved the determination by Milwaukee's building inspection authorities
that the plaintiffs' apartments were unfit for human habitation. The Devines court held
that the plaintiffs had a legal right to occupy their dwellings until those rights were
terminated by an administrative official's discretionary enforcement of the city's building
code. Devines, 665 F.2d at 144. In so concluding, the court relied on a finding that the
laws which gave the city authority to act were not self-executing, and therefore the plaintiffs had no prior notice that occupancy of their apartments violated state and local laws.
Id. at 148.
An analysis of the Devines opinion reveals that there is no language which limits its
holding to administrative vacate orders. The court held that the City of Milwaukee terminated plaintiffs' leasehold rights for a public purpose, thus placing a disproportionate
burden on the plaintiffs who had no choice but to live in substandard hcusing. Id. at 146.
The holding does not specify that the city terminated the leasehold rights through administrative as opposed to judicial action. What appears to be dispositive to the Devines court
is not that administrative action was involved but that the state action terminating
plaintiffs' leasehold rights involved discretionary judgment. Id. at 144. The existence of
discretionary judgment is vital to the court because so long as the tenants had no knowledge prior to the posting of the vacate order that they were living in illegal conditions,
they possessed a compensable leasehold interest.
There is a significant element of discretionary judgment involved in the case of judicial
vacate orders. The judge replaces the building inspection official as the individual authorized by the state to determine whether a particular premises is uninhabitable within the
meaning of applicable state and municipal laws. A vacate order is entered on the motion
of a state official, namely municipal corporation counsel, and the judge exercises considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant the motion.
Clearly the fact that the judge makes the legal determination of uninhabitability does
not transform the applicable building code laws into self-executing statutes. Just as the
tenant in Milwaukee whose apartment is adjudged uninhabitable by the building inspector enjoys the legal right to occupancy until the administrative determination of uninhabitability is made, a tenant in Chicago has a legal right of occupancy until a judge
determines uninhabitability. Therefore, at the time a judicial vacate order is entered the
tenant possesses a legally compensable property interest.
The primary argument for limiting the Devines decision to administrative vacate
orders finds its source in Judge Fairchild's concurring opinion. See supra note 100. If one
accepts his premise that there is no taking when a reasonable person would find a dwelling uninhabitable, a judicial vacate order could be viewed as "the mere adjudication of
that status" of uninhabitability referred to by Judge Fairchild. Devines, 665 F.2d at 148
(Fairchild, J., concurring). Such an adjudication by a court would not constitute a compensable taking under this analysis because no discretion would be involved-the court
would be acting only because the tenants were unreasonable in having failed to move on
their own volition when the building became uninhabitable.
Arguably, there is a qualitative distinction between an administrative and a judicial
vacate order. Some would see a judge as a more neutral party than a building inspector
because the judge could sift evidence and apply the law fairly. A building inspector, on
the other hand, would be more likely to abuse discretion because he might act unilaterally without due process to the owner or the tenants. In a court setting, the inspector
must report the building conditions to the judge. The owner, if represented, could challenge the inspection and contest the entry of a vacate order. The tenants, if aware of the
proceeding, could intervene to protect their interests. Therefore, a judicial proceeding
would be less likely to result in capricious discretionary decisions to vacate buildings
than an administrative proceeding.
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police power. 146 Public bodies will argue that it is inimical to
public policy for cities to pay for validly exercising their police
power in the area of housing maintenance. 147 Financiallystrapped governments will point to the burden of paying just
compensation to convince courts that they will be deterred from

The case for limiting the scope of Devines to administrative action is not a strong one.
A judicial vacate order involves a discretionary judgment on the part of the judge that a
building is uninhabitable. While a judge's discretion may be less likely to be abused than
that of an administrative official, due to the procedural safeguards inherent in the judicial process, the judge's decision is nonetheless discretionary. Devines did not find administrative vacate orders to be compensable takings because discretion was abused, but
because the laws that authorized the vacate orders were not self-executing.
An analysis of Devines dictates the conclusion that any vacate order entered for a
public purpose pursuant to laws which are not self-executing gives rise to a cause of
action for just compensation under the fifth amendment. Administrative and judicial
vacate orders are merely different means by which the state achieves its end of promoting the public health and safety by vacating uninhabitable buildings. Both types of
vacate orders enforce statutes which are not self-executing. Both involve discretionary
judgment. In both cases the tenants' right to occupy the premises exists until the order is
entered. Finally, in both cases, the state action of entering a vacate order totally extinguishes the legally compensable property rights of tenants.
146. The state police power is one of the least limitable powers of the state. Comment,
The Landlord's Economic Inability to Meet Housing Code Requirements: The 'Hot Bath'
Ordinance,an Illustration,23 ST. LOuis U.LJ. 163 (1979)
147. It is significant for the future of "takings" law that the Devines decision makes
no mention of the potential financial burden just compensation will place upon municipalities for the valid enforcement of building code regulations. The district court was
clearly swayed by the defendants' argument that a finding of a taking resulting from a
vacate order would place such a substantial financial burden upon the city that it would
be deterred from enforcing valid regulations. See supra text accompanying note 65. This
policy argument, supported by the precedent of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), did
not move the Seventh Circuit.
One explanation for the Seventh Circuit's failure to discuss the policy issue of whether
the cost of just compensation to municipalities would prevent necessary enforcement of
building codes lies in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. City of San Diego. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). San Diego Gas & Electric was the Supreme
Court "takings" case of greatest significance to the Devines court. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text. In San Diego Gas & Electric, Justice Brennan did not lend a
sympathetic ear to San Diego's policy argument that payment of just compensation
would deter the city from enacting valid land use laws pursuant to its police power. Justice Brennan stated that the vindication of constitutional guarantees is not a matter to be
decided on the basis of policy judgments and that the vindication of such rights cannot
depend upon the expense of doing so. 450 U.S. at 661. See also Kmiec, supra note 97, at 52
(1982); Oakes, Property Rights in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH.L. REV. 583
(1981).
The extent to which the Seventh Circuit was influenced by San Diego Gas & Electric
bodes ill for municipalities if the court's reliance precurses the reliance of other high
courts on San Diego Gas & Electricfor guidance in the area of police power takings. As
noted earlier, San Diego Gas & Electric is not binding on the circuits. See supra notes
47-48 and accompanying text. The fact that the case is not binding, however, does not
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effectively enforcing their housing code. 14 8 However, there is
considerable support for the view that the burdensome cost of
just compensation is not a permissible consideration in a court's
determination of a takings question. Justice Holmes noted in
PennsylvaniaCoal v. Mahon 149 that there is no short cut around
payment of just compensation when a regulation goes so far as
to take private property.150
The Devines decision will also influence the burgeoning urban
tenants movement that has developed in large part due to the
phenomenon of urban displacement. 15 1 Intensive code enforcement has been used at times as an alternative to full-scale urban
renewal as cities have utilized vacate orders to remove tenants
52
from an area in order to make way for economic development.1

preclude lower courts from seeking guidance from the dissent as to a majority of the
Court's perspective on the compensability of valid police power takings. If other courts
follow the lead of Devines in relying upon San Diego Gas & Electric,municipalities may
find themselves liable for just compensation due to the impact of regulations, such as
vacate orders, which have never before been considered to take private property.
148. The argument that exposure of municipalities to liability for just compensation
as a result of valid police power regulation will have a chilling effect on the valid exercise
of these powers has its roots in Mugler v. Kansas. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text. The argument has been reiterated in recent times and was accepted by the Supreme
Court of California. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 275, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). For a discussion of the policy
arguments involved in the question of governmental liability for regulatory takings, see
Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation As a Remedy for Regulatory Takings, 8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 517 (1981).
149. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
150. Justice Holmes stated: "A strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change." Id. at 416. See also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. The National Tenants Union (NTU) was formed in 1980 as a coalition of tenant
organizations from most major cities throughout the country. NTU formed in response to
the need local tenant organizations felt for national efforts to promote tenants' rights.
Displacement is defined as "[i]nvoluntary movement of people from their dwellings
because of circumstances beyond their control." 7 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 333 (1980). A
study of displacement between 1973 and 1976 revealed the following statistics: 50% of
displaced heads of households earned less than $5000.00, 38% of the heads of households
were black, 40% were women, at 16% were elderly. Id. In 1978 HUD reported that between
1.7 and 2.4 million people were displaced by government projects, private reinvestments
or private disinvestment. 9 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 427 (1981). See also LeGates &
Hartman, Displacement,15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 207 (1981).
152. Mandelker, supra note 88, at 671. Pearlman & Baar, supra note 120, wrote: "Code
enforcement and renewal frequently stimulate investor activity in areas immediately
adjacent to project boundaries, often causing displacement through rent increases and
demolition." Id. at 332.
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On the strength of Devines, tenants will be in a position to compel municipalities to pay just compensation when they are forced
to move by vacate orders. By exercising their right to just compensation tenants in circuits that follow Devines will be able to
deter municipalities from utilizing code enforcement as a pretext
for achieving a governmental goal of displacing low income peo153
ple from "desirable" urban neighborhoods.
The political lobbying efforts of the tenant movement will also
be strengthened by the Devines decision. By pointing to the
prospect of costly compensation when vacate orders are entered,
tenants will have leverage in influencing politicians to implement policies encouraging maintenance of existing apartments
in habitable condition. 15 4 City officials who know that tenants
are aware of their right to just compensation will be more likely
to respond positively to tenants' lobbying efforts on behalf of
programs, laws, and policies designed to prevent the substandard conditions that necessitate vacate orders.
CONCLUSION

Although the Devines decision is not a panacea for the tenants
movement, the case has important consequences for low income
tenants and for urban policymakers. For the first time, a court
has recognized that tenants displaced by municipal code enforcement have fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to just compensation for the taking of their leasehold interests. This finding
is made more significant by the fact that code enforcement involves nuisance abatement, an area of municipal activity traditionally considered to be non-compensable when abatement of a
nuisance results in the destruction of private property.

In the Devines case, a Milwaukee city official indicated in his deposition that the City

of Milwaukee utilizes housing code vacate orders rather than eminent domain proceedings to empty dwellings because code enforcement provides a quicker and more efficient
means of achieving Milwaukee's housing goals. Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Devines v.
Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
153. Tenants have a strong interest in preventing involuntary displacement by vacate
orders for two reasons. First, the human cost of being forced to move is tremendous. Loss
of neighborhood ties, new school assignments for children, and the anxiety of being poor
and homeless all represent substantial human costs exacted by a vacate order. See supra
note 89. Second, housing costs invariably increase for all tenants when other tenants are
displaced by a vacate order. When units are taken off the rental market by vacate orders,
housing becomes more scarce and rents inevitably increase. Pinsky, supra note 106, at 97.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44. See also Abbott, supra note 142, at
56-60.
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While the formula for measuring plaintiffs' just compensation
is yet to be conclusively determined, it appears likely that, at a
minimum, tenants displaced by code enforcement will recover
their moving expenses and the costs incurred in the search for
replacement housing. This recovery will be important to tenants
because, for the most part, tenants who are forced to vacate their
dwellings due to substandard conditions are poor. The prospect
of paying just compensation will encourage municipalities to
promote the maintenance of housing stock in habitable condition in order to avoid the burden of liability for enforcing vacate
orders.
DANIEL BURKE

